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Georgia Death Penalty Law

by Mike Mears*
and
Ken Driggs**
This Article covers death penalty decisions from the Georgia Supreme
Court for the period from January 1, 1999 to May 31, 2000. It primarily
discusses direct appeal decisions but reaches cases in a few other
settings as well. This Article does not discuss holdings in capital cases
that are common to all criminal appeals but is limited to death penalty
law. Recent developments in Georgia death penalty law are considered
in the order they would appear in a capital trial. In the period covered
by this Article, the Georgia Supreme Court considered thirteen death
sentences imposed in superior courts following a trial, one capital
resentencing, one opinion following a remand on jury misconduct claims,
and one interim appeal. On October 1, 2000, 135 men and one woman
were on the Georgia death row.' On May 31, 2000, eighty-one cases
were pending statewide in which the district attorney had filed a Notice
of Intent to Seek Death.2

* The Georgia Multi-County Public Defender since 1992. Mississippi State University
(B.S., 1968; M.A., 1969); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 1977). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
** Assistant DeKalb County Public Defender. University of Florida (B.S., 1970);
Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 1980); University of Wisconsin (LL.M., 1991).
Member, State Bars of Georgia, Florida, Texas, and Wisconsin.
1. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, DEATH Row, U.S.A. (Fall 2000).
2. The Unified Appeal rules require that at the first proceeding the district attorney
notify the defendant in writing of his intention to seek a death sentence. A copy of the
written notice must be filed with the clerk of the superior court who, within ten days, must
forward a copy to the clerk of the Georgia Supreme Court. GA. R. UNIFIED APP. 2(C)(1)
(2000).
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PRE-TRIAL ISSUES

This discussion includes pretrial motions, discovery, pleas, and other
matters taking place before jury selection begins.
James Ringo
McDaniel was about to proceed with a Butts County jury trial for the
murder of his grandparents and ten-year-old brother. After the
preliminary voir dire of the jurors, the trial court called the parties in
chambers for a conference. The judge restated earlier discussions with
counsel in which he said that, as an individual or as a judge, he would
be reluctant to impose a death sentence.3 He went on to say that if
defendant entered a guilty plea and waived a jury at his sentencing
hearing, the trial court was "'90 percent certain [to] impose a life
without parole sentence."' 4 The prosecution would not agree to a
negotiated plea of life without parole, insisting on the state's right to put
up evidence and argue for a death sentence. Consequently, McDaniel
entered a guilty plea and waived a jury. After a sentencing hearing, the
trial court sentenced McDaniel to death for the murder of his brother.5
The Georgia Supreme Court held this exchange violated Uniform
Superior Court Rule ("USCR") 33.5(A), s prohibiting judicial participation
in the plea negotiation process and reversed.7 A unanimous court
wrote:
Due to the force and majesty of the judiciary, a trial court's participation in the plea negotiation may skew the defendant's decision-making
and render the plea involuntary because a defendant may disregard
proper considerations and waive rights based solely on the trial court's
stated inclination as to sentence.
In this case, McDaniel heard the trial court repeatedly state its
reluctance to impose a death sentence and give ninety percent odds on
a sentence of life without parole if permitted to impose sentence. That
participation by the trial court in the plea negotiation process rendered
the resulting guilty plea involuntary'
In Gulley v.State,9 the defense filed a motion requesting 120 days
notice of the Dougherty County District Attorney's intention to rely upon
"'other crimes or bad acts or similar transactions or occurrences in

3. McDaniel v. State, 271 Ga. 552, 553, 522 S.E.2d 648, 649 (1999).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6.
7.
8.
9.

GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 33.5(A) (2000).
271 Ga. at 553, 522 S.E.2d at 650.
Id. at 554, 522 S.E.2d at 650 (internal citations omitted).
271 Ga. 337, 519 S.E.2d 655 (1999).
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evidence against him."'1 ° The motion was grounded in USCR 31, which
governs the introduction of similar transactions evidence. Twenty-seven
days before trial, the prosecutors notified the Gulley defense team of
their intention to use testimony about an as yet unprosecuted East Point
double murder during the sentencing phase. Defense counsel was
previously aware of the East Point situation, and the trial court had
ordered open file discovery." The Georgia Supreme Court held that
this was not the kind of evidence contemplated by USCR 31 and that the
section
state had satisfied Offical Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.")
12
17-10-2, which required pretrial notice of such testimony.
In Johnson v.State," a Dougherty County defendant wished to
question the district attorney and former district attorney regarding
cases in which the prosecution did not seek death, which he alleged were
more heinous than his crime.' 4 The trial court quashed the subpoenas,
and the Georgia Supreme Court found no error." The court reasoned
that district attorneys did "not have unfettered discretion to seek the
death penalty" because a jury could always decline to find the necessary
statutory aggravating circumstance. 6 The court also found that policy
considerations disfavored such a defense tactic. 7 The court further
pointed out that Johnson was invited to file a written proffer of more
heinous cases in which the State declined to seek the death penalty, but
he failed to do so.'"
In 1994 the General Assembly enacted the Criminal Procedure
Discovery Act, which provides for extensive reciprocal discovery for those
defendants who elect to take advantage of it. 19 By opting in, the
defendant receives extensive materials from the State, some of which
previously had been unavailable. ° At the same time, reciprocal
discovery requires the defense to disclose things it otherwise could keep
confidential.2 ' The defendant who does not opt in receives minimal
discovery under the Act.22 The Act is silent as to its application in

10.

Id. at 341, 519 S.E.2d at 660.

11. Id.
12.
13.
14.

Id., 519 S.E.2d at 660-61.
271 Ga. 375, 519 S.E.2d 221 (1991).
Id. at 379, 519 S.E.2d at 227.

15. Id.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. (quoting McClain v. State, 267 Ga. 378, 389, 477 S.E.2d 814, 825 (1996)).
Id. (citing Perkins v. State, 269 Ga. 791, 794, 505 S.E.2d 16, 19 (1998)).
271 Ga. at 379, 519 S.E.2d at 227.
O.C.G.A. § 17-16-1 et seq. (1998).
Id. § 17-16-4.

21.

Id.

22.

Id. § 17-16-3.
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capital cases. The multicounty public defender challenged the constitutionality of the Act through an interim appeal in the Clayton County
death penalty prosecution of John Lucious.23
In State v. Lucious,24 the Georgia Supreme Court held the Act was
constitutional in a 4-3 decision.25 In a short one-paragraph discussion,
the majority held that the Act did not apply to presentence hearings in
capital and noncapital cases. 26 Death penalty defendants could safely
opt in without having to give away their sentencing phase strategy in
advance. Justice Fletcher, concurring in part and dissenting in part, set
out a list of thirteen types of information available to the defense
through federal and state constitutional law or other statutory authority
without opting in. 27 These include but are not limited to exculpatory
evidence;2" evidence of an understanding, agreement, or promise of
leniency;2 9 victim impact testimony;3" and notice of similar transaction
evidence.31
In another case, the court affirmed that "[i]t is not incumbent upon the
state to notify a defendant prior to trial of every statutory aggravating
circumstance that it might seek to prove."32
II. JURY SELECTION
This section concerns jury arrays and jury selection in capital cases.
Death penalty juries differ from other criminal juries in that they must
be "death qualified."33 This means they can consider and impose a
death sentence. Individuals who object to the death penalty on religious,
moral, or any other grounds can be excluded from jury service. In some
communities these individuals constitute a substantial part of the venire
and are more likely to be racial minorities. "The death qualification of
prospective jurors is not unconstitutional."34

23. State v. Lucious, 271 Ga. 361, 362, 518 S.E.2d 677, 679-80 (1999).
24. 271 Ga. 361, 518 S.E.2d 677 (1999).
25. Id. at 366, 518 S.E.2d at 682.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 368-70, 518 S.E.2d at 683-85 (Fletcher, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
28. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963).
29. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972).
30. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2 (1998); see also Livingston v. State, 264 Ga. 402, 404, 444
S.E.2d 748, 751 (1994); Turner v. State, 268 Ga. 213, 215, 486 S.E.2d 839, 842 (1997).
31. 271 Ga. at 368, 518 S.E.2d at 683-85.
32. Sears v. State, 270 Ga. 843, 842, 514 S.E.2d 426, 435 (1999).
33. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
34. Cromartie v. State, 270 Ga. 780, 783, 514 S.E.2d 205, 210 (1999).
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The most striking jury selection decision was Nance v. State,35 in
which a Gwinnett County capital defendant secured a new sentencing
proceeding because the trial court failed to remove a juror for cause.
The juror stated three times that she would automatically vote for death
upon a conviction for murder and a finding of a statutory aggravating
circumstance. s A unanimous Georgia Supreme Court wrote that "the
trial court erred by failing to excuse prospective juror Johnson for cause
because her views in favor of capital punishment would prevent or
substantially impair the performance of her duties as a juror in
accordance with her instructions and oath." 7
The standard of review when a trial court denies a challenge to a
prospective juror for cause is "some manifest abuse of discretion," which
on appeal required giving "deference [to] the trial court's resolution of
any equivocations or conflicts in the prospective juror's responses on voir
dire" based upon a review of the record as a whole.3"
In Terrell v. State,39 a Newton County conviction and death sentence
was reversed on another jury error.4" A military policeman for the
Georgia National Guard who had arrest powers was allowed to sit on the
capital jury of defendant Brian Keith Terrell. Defendant moved to strike
him for cause, but the trial court denied the motion. After being
convicted, defendant moved for a new trial. The motion was denied, and
defendant appealed. Reversing the trial court, the supreme court
observed that

35. 272 Ga. 217, 526 S.E.2d 560 (2000).
36. Id. at 222-23, 526 S.E.2d at 566-67.
37. Id. at 222, 526 S.E.2d at 567 (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985));
see also Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992).
38. Id. at 222-23, 526 S.E.2d at 566-67; see also Wilson v. State, 271 Ga. 811, 815-16,
525 S.E.2d 339, 345 (1999). Cf.Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 834, 524 S.E.2d 490, 499 (1999)
(holding that "[a] prospective juror is not subject to excusal for cause for merely leaning for
or against a death sentence"); Gulley v. State, 271 Ga. 337, 345, 519 S.E.2d 655, 662-63
(1999) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excusing a prospective
juror who knew the victims but could never vote to impose the death penalty, excusing
another who "vacillated about whether he could impose the death penalty," and retaining
a third who had heard about the case from the news but could set that information aside
and decide the case based solely on what he heard in court); Cromartie, 270 Ga. at 784, 514
S.E.2d at 211 (holding that, in general, "'ajuror who merely "leans" one way or the other
before hearing any evidence is not disqualifed;'") (quoting Jarrell v. State, 261 Ga. 880,
881, 413 S.E.2d 710, 712 (1992)); Pruitt v. State, 270 Ga. 745, 751, 514 S.E.2d 639, 647
(1999) (denying relief when "three prospective jurors expressed a strong preference for the
death penalty, [but] also stated that they could consider all the circumstances and both life
and death as possible sentences").
39. 271 Ga. 783, 523 S.E.2d 294 (1999).
40. Id. at 789, 523 S.E.2d at 299.
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[iut
is well-settled that full-time police officers with arrest powers must
be excused if challenged for cause, because it "is inherent in the nature
of police duties and the closeness with which such officers are
identified with criminal procedures that questions regarding possible
bias, fairness, prejudice or impermissible influence upon jury deliberations inevitably arise."4
In Pace v. State,42 the supreme court distinguished a corrections
officer and a private security guard, neither of whom had arrest powers,
from a police officer.43 The trial court refused to strike both jurors for
cause.4 4 The supreme court affirmed.45
In Wilson v. State,46 defendant Marion Wilson, Jr. was prosecuted for
the 1996 murder of a correctional officer in a county where many people
were employed by the Department of Corrections. The defense moved
for a blanket disqualification of all venirepersons so employed and was
denied by the trial court.4 7 The supreme court affirmed, commenting
that "the trial court adequately considered the potential bias of
individual jurors connected to the Department of Corrections, and,
accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying
Wilson's blanket motion."4 8
In Cromartie v. State,49 the victim, a convenience store clerk, posed
a similar jury selection issue. When two prospective jurors who had
business connections with the convenience store industry were questioned about their ability to judge the case without bias, they gave what
the court called "some equivocal responses."5 ° On appeal the supreme
court declined to second guess the trial court's acceptance of the
prospective jurors' statements that they "could lay aside their opinions
regarding convenience store robberies and render a verdict based solely
on the evidence." 51
At least two defendants challenged the exclusion of jurors who opposed
the death penalty on religious grounds, and both claims were rejected by

41.
S.E.2d
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 783, 523 S.E.2d at 296 (quoting Hutcheson v. State, 246 Ga. 13, 14, 268
643, 644 (1980)).
271 Ga. 829, 524 S.E.2d 490 (1999).
Id. at 834, 524 S.E.2d at 500.
Id. at 834-35, 524 S.E.2d at 500.
Id. at 846, 524 S.E.2d at 512.
271 Ga. 811, 525 S.E.2d 339 (1999).
Id. at 816-17, 525 S.E.2d at 346.
Id. at 816-17, 525 S.E.2d at 346.
270 Ga. 780, 514 S.E.2d 205 (1999).
Id. at 784-85, 514 S.E.2d at 211-12.
Id. at 784, 514 S.E.2d at 211-12.
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the Georgia Supreme Court.5 2 "The standard for excusing a prospective
juror based upon the prospective juror's views on the death penalty
draws no religious or secular distinction."53 The court, in Pace, found
that the excusal of jurors opposed to the death penalty on religious
grounds did not violate state and federal constitutional guarantees of
religious freedom.54
Defendant in Sears v State" argued he was entitled to a new trial
because a juror lied on the questionnaire completed before voir dire. The
question at issue concerned whether the juror or any member of his
family had been the victim of a crime. On remand the juror, explaining
why he had not listed the unreported rape of his daughter by a brotherin-law, testified that he answered the question correctly as he understood it.56 The Georgia Supreme Court did not see this as a lie and
commented that even a correct answer would not have given rise to a
challenge for cause. 7 The court quoted with favor a federal court
decision stating that "'we must be tolerant, as jurors may forget
incidents long buried in their minds, misunderstand
a question or bend
58
embarrassment.'
avoid
to
bit
a
truth
the
In Speed v. State, 9 an African-American venirewoman was excused
because of a comment made in her presence by defense counsel. The
woman indicated she believed the criminal justice system was biased
against blacks and that the death penalty was more likely to be sought
against African-Americans charged with killing whites. When the
prosecutor asked how strongly she held these beliefs, defense counsel
objected with the statement, "It's a fact. [The assistant district attorney]
knows that his office seeks the death penalty more often against black
defendants."" The State's request to have the woman excused for
cause based upon the statement by defense counsel was granted by the
trial court and affirmed on appeal.6 '

52. Id. at 785, 514 S.E.2d at 212; Pace, 271 Ga. at 836, 524 S.E.2d at 501.
53. 270 Ga. at 785, 514 S.E.2d at 212.
54. 271 Ga. at 836, 524 S.E.2d at 501.
55. 270 Ga. 834, 514 S.E.2d 426 (1999).
56. Id. at 839-40, 514 S.E.2d at 433-34.
57. Id. at 840, 514 S.E.2d at 434.
58. 270 Ga. at 839-40, 514 S.E.2d at 433-34 (quoting Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970
(9th Cir. 1998)).
59. 270 Ga. 688, 512 S.E.2d 896 (1999).
60. Id. at 691, 512 S.E.2d at 903.
61. Id.
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TRIAL ON GUILT/INNOCENCE

This section will discuss those trial issues particularly relevant to a
death penalty case. In Nance v. State,62 the defense announced before
trial its intention to present expert mental health testimony in a possible
sentencing phase.63 An established rule provides that in this circumstance, the defendant is required to submit to a mental health examination by a state expert who could then respond to such defense testimony." In the course of this examination by Dr. Theresa Sapp and after
Miranda warnings, Michael Wayne Nance told her he had used cocaine
and marijuana before the bank robbery and accompanying murder.6"
In its case in chief during the guilt phase, the prosecutor called Dr. Sapp
as a lay witness. Over Nance's objection she testified to the admissions
of drug use the morning of the crime. 6 The supreme court held this
was error, noting that "[a]ccess to the defendant's psyche was permitted
so the State could respond to the defendant's mental health expert, not
to gather incriminatingstatements that bolster the State's case."67 The

court concluded by stating:
We therefore restate our holding in Abernathy that when a defendant
must submit to a court-ordered mental health examination because he
wishes to present expert mental health testimony at trial, the State
expert may only testify in rebuttal to the testimony of the defense expert
or to rebut the testimony of the defendant himself. The trial court erred
by allowing the State to introduce this evidence other than in rebuttal;
however, we conclude that the evidence that Nance ingested alcohol
and illegal drugs on the morning of the murder was harmless due to
the overwhelming evidence of his guilt.68
In Cromartie,which dealt with the murder of a convenience store clerk
during a robbery, the defense sought to have the jury instructed on
felony murder as a lesser included offense of malice murder.69 Ray
Jefferson Cromartie was not indicted for felony murder but for malice
murder. The supreme court held the issue was controlled by Henry v.

62. 272 Ga. 217, 526 S.E.2d 560 (2000).
63. Id. at 218, 526 S.E.2d at 564.
64. Abernathy v. State, 265 Ga. 754, 755, 462 S.E.2d 615, 616 (1995); Jenkins v. State,
265 Ga. 539, 540, 458 S.E.2d 477, 478 (1995).
65. 272 Ga. at 219, 526 S.E.2d at 564.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 220, 526 S.E.2d at 565 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 220-21, 526 S.E.2d at 565-66 (emphasis added) (citations ommitted).
69. 270 Ga. at 787, 514 S.E.2d at 213.
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State,7° and that the defense was not entitled to such a jury charge.71
The court stated that this was a meaningless distinction because
evidence in the record was sufficient to make defendant eligible for a
death sentence under Tison v. State72 and Jefferson v. State,73 had he
been convicted of felony murder.74
The Georgia Supreme Court has also said a defendant asserting at the
guilt phase his ineligibility for the death penalty under O.C.G.A. section
17-7-131(c)(3) because of mental retardation still had the burden of proof
"beyond a reasonable doubt. 75
The court in Sears affirmed that the crime of kidnapping with bodily
injury, when the injury was the death of the victim, was a capital
offense.76
IV. THE SENTENCING HEARING
A Georgia defendant convicted of murder under O.C.G.A. section 16-5in a case in which the district attorney has announced his intention
to seek a death penalty, then proceeds to a sentencing hearing before the
same jury.78 In Wilson the supreme court reaffirmed that "laIllowing
opening statements at the beginning of the sentencing phase is the
79
better practice, but is not required."
0
In Carruthers v. State,8 victim impact testimony by a psychiatrist
who treated the victim's mentally handicapped child, both before and
after the murder, was held to be proper.81 The court observed that
O.C.G.A. section 17-10-1.2 specifically authorized testimony from
witnesses "having personal knowledge of the impact of the crime on the
victim, the victim's family, or the community."12 The court went on to
1, 77

70. 265 Ga. 732, 462 S.E.2d 737 (1995) (holding that felony murder is not a lesser
included offense of malice murder because it requires additional proof).
71. 270 Ga. at 787, 514 S.E.2d at 213.
72. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
73. 256 Ga. 821, 353 S.E.2d 468 (1987).
74. 270 Ga. at 787-88, 514 S.E.2d at 213-14.
75. Palmer v. State, 271 Ga. 234, 237, 517 S.E.2d 502, 506 (1999).
76. 270 Ga. at 841, 514 S.E.2d at 434.
77. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1 (1998).
78. Id. §§ 17-10-2,-30.
79. 271 Ga. at 818, 525 S.E.2d at 347 (emphasis added) (citing Smith v. State, 270 Ga.
240, 250, 510 S.E.2d 1, 11 (1998)).
80. 272 Ga. 306, 528 S.E.2d 217 (2000).
81. Id. at 317, 528 S.E.2d at 227.
82. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1.2 (1998)).
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observe "the testimony was narrowly tailored s 3 as required by Turner
v. State.s4
Similarly, the supreme court reiterated the general rule that "it is not
error to admit a photograph of the victim while in life."8 5 However, the
court in Wilson observed that "the better practice is to have the
photograph
identified by someone other than a close relative of the
86
victim."
Also in Wilson, the court held that prosecutors could present the jury
with evidence of a defendant's juvenile record as well evidence of adult
conduct that had not resulted in a conviction."7 So long as "[elvidence
of bad character and previous crimes [was] reliable," it could go to the
jury.8 8 Such "evidence of acts reflecting bad character need not be
evaluated according to the reasonable doubt standard." 9
In a 1998 decision the Georgia Supreme Court held that "no unnecessary restrictions should be imposed on the mitigation evidence that a
defendant can present in the sentencing phase regarding his individual
background and character."9" In Barnes v. State,9 the trial court
excluded love poems defendant had written to his wife, and defendant
won a new sentencing phase because of the error.92
The court returned to and appeared to limit Barnes in Pace.9" The
court affirmed the exclusion of mitigation testimony as hearsay. A
friend had been offered to testify about the contents of inspirational
letters she had received from the defendant but had later thrown away.
Pace argued that the rules of evidence were relaxed in the sentencing
phase of a capital trial. 94 In affirming the trial court, the supreme

83. Id.
84. 268 Ga. 213, 214-16, 486 S.E.2d 839, 841-42 (1997).
85. 271 Ga. at 344, 519 S.E.2d at 662.
86. 271 Ga. at 819, 525 S.E.2d at 347-48; see also Speed, 270 Ga. at 692, 512 S.E.2d at
904.
87. 271 Ga. at 822, 525 S.E.2d at 350.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 823, 525 S.E.2d at 350; see also Pace, 271 Ga. at 842, 524 S.E.2d at 505
(allowing evidence of burglaries and other crimes committed by defendant); Terrell, 271 Ga.
at 788, 523 S.E.2d at 299 (approving as non-statutory aggravation testimony that
defendant "set a fire in his jail cell while awaiting trial"); Gulley, 271 Ga. at 345, 519
S.E.2d at 663 (allowing as bad character evidence testimony by a court-appointed
psychiatrist that defendant said he did not use drugs but had sold cocaine for several
years).

90. Barnes v. State, 269 Ga. 345, 360, 496 S.E.2d 674, 689 (1998).
91. 269 Ga. 345, 496 S.E.2d 674 (1998).
92. Id. at 360, 496 S.E.2d at 689.
93. 271 Ga. at 843, 524 S.E.2d at 505.
94. Id.
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court wrote "the hearsay rule is not suspended in the sentencing phase,
and the defense made no proffer to enable the Court to determine if the
mitigating influence of the excluded testimony outweighed the harm
from violation of the hearsay rule."95
A similar issue arose in Gulley.9" Defendant sought to introduce a
1992 Atlanta Journal-Constitutionnewspaper article crediting a Bill
Gulley with saving the lives of two people over a three-day period.
Gulley sought to introduce the evidence through a friend he had shown
the clipping to, claiming to be the Bill Gulley mentioned in the article.
The State objected on hearsay grounds.97 Defendant did not take the
stand, and the Constitution reporter who wrote the article sought to
quash his subpoena, stating that he could not "swear that the defendant
is even the 'Bill Gulley' whom he reported on in 1992."" s The Georgia
Supreme Court ruled against Gulley, stating that "the hearsay rule is
not suspended in the sentencing phase"99 and that there°°were "insufficient circumstances of reliability regarding the article."
In Sears after nine hours of sentencing phase deliberation, the jury
sent a note to the trial judge stating "there is a hopeless deadlock with
no hope of resolution."" 1 The note indicated the jurors were split
eleven to one. Defendant argued that the deadlock was a verdict for life,
but the trial court declined to accept the verdict and gave the jury an
Allen charge. 1 2 Deliberations continued to be extremely contentious
for another period before the jury was excused for the evening. The next
day, after more deliberation, the foreman and the hold-out juror both
sent notes to the trial court accusing each other of misconduct. The jury
was again given a form of Allen charge, and it retired for another two
and a half hours before returning a verdict of death.'
On this record, the Georgia Supreme Court declined to find that the
verdict was coerced by the trial court. 104 The court stated the standard
of review was the totality of the circumstances.' 5 "Although the jury

95.

Id. at 842, 524 S.E.2d at 505.

96. 271 Ga. at 346, 519 S.E.2d at 663-64.
97. Id., 519 S.E.2d at 664.
98. Id. at 347, 519 S.E.2d at 664.
99.
100.
10.

101.

Smith v. State, 270 Ga. 240, 249, 510 S.E.2d 1, 9-10 (1998).
271 Ga. at 347, 519 S.E.2d at 664; see also Smith, 270 Ga. at 249, 510 S.E.2d at

270 Ga. at 835, 514 S.E.2d at 430.

102. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 494-95 (1896); see also WILLIAM W. DANIEL,
GEORGIA CRIMINAL TRIAL PRACTICE § 24 (1999).
103. 270 Ga. at 835-39, 514 S.E.2d at 430-33.
104. Id. at 837, 514 S.E.2d at 432.
105. Id. (citing to Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446 (1965)).
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twice stated that it was at an eleven to one 'deadlock,' the trial court
was not bound by those pronouncements.",1 6 The court also observed
that nine hours of deliberation in a capital sentencing phase was not
enough to amount to hopeless deadlock. 10 7 Justice Fletcher dissented
with a lengthy opinion, writing that he found the threats against the
holdout juror and the trial court's refusal to give the jury any guidance
coercive.'Os
A similar issue was raised in Cromartie when, after three hours of
deliberation, the jury sent out a note asking, "As jurors, we would like
to know what happens if we do not come up with a unanimous
vote?""0 9 The trial court responded that it could not answer the jury's
question and it should continue to deliberate until it reached a
unanimous verdict."0 On appeal the charge was held not to be
error.111
The Georgia Supreme Court held that it was not error to fail to
instruct the sentencing jury on specific kinds of mitigation, including
residual doubt." 2 Nor was it error to decline to instruct the jury that
life was the presumptive sentence and that it could only return a death
sentence by unanimously finding a statutory aggravating circumstance." 3 The trial court was not required to reinstruct the jury on
the definition of reasonable doubt at the sentencing hearing." 4
In Pruitt defense counsel informed the court his client was acting
irrationally in the sentencing hearing and sought a psychological
evaluation. It turned out Pruitt was telling his lawyer he preferred a
death sentence to life in prison. On appeal, the defense argued that it
was error not to have an evaluation at that point." 5 But the Georgia
Supreme Court found there were no indications of mental health
problems with defendant." 6 "After having been informed, a competent
defendant, and not his counsel, makes the ultimate decision about
whether to testify or present mitigation evidence."" 7

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 838, 514 S.E.2d at 432.
Id.
Id. at 846-47, 514 S.E.2d at 438-40.
270 Ga. at 789, 514 S.E.2d at 214.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 788, 514 S.E.2d at 214; Johnson, 271 Ga. at 385, 519 S.E.2d at 231
271 Ga. at 385, 519 S.E.2d at 231.
270 Ga. at 788, 514 S.E.2d at 214.
270 Ga. at 756, 514 S.E.2d at 650.
Id.
Id. (citing Morrison v. State, 258 Ga. 683, 686, 373 S.E.2d 506, 508-09 (1988)).
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V.

PRESERVATION OF ERROR

Several times the Georgia Supreme Court refused to consider relief on
an otherwise arguable claim because trial counsel had failed to properly
preserve the error for review. The most striking example of the need to
preserve error came in Holsey v. State"' in which the jury was taken
to view a crime scene without defendant being present. Robert Wayne
Holsey was being prosecuted in Morgan County for robbing a convenience store and later shooting a responding deputy to death. At a
viewing of the convenience store, a juror asked questions about the
physical layout which, with the agreement of defense counsel, were
answered by an unsworn and unidentified witness. When the situation
was later discussed in court, defendant's attorney again made no
objection, and Holsey made no comment. Holsey objected for the first
time on appeal." 9 The Georgia Supreme Court found that Holsey
acquiesced and that the issue was not preserved for appellate review. 120

Another viewing by a jury was appealed in Wilson. 12 ' This time the
drove by the crime scene in a
trial judge was not present when the jury
122
bus, pausing momentarily to observe.
The defense objected to having the trial judge travel on the bus with
The trial
the jury, and the trial court acceded to the objection ....

court dismissed the jury from the courtroom to board the bus with
instructions ... that they were to recognize their arrival at the crime

names discussed at trial and by
scene based on their memory of street
12
the momentary pause of the bus.

Defendant did not raise any objections to any aspect of this procedure
until the appeal. 124 The Georgia Supreme Court found no error,
stating that:
the absence of the trial judge from the trial proceedings is reversible
error when it is objected to and when it results in some harm.

However, in this case, no objection was made to the trialjudge's brief

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

271 Ga. 856, 524 S.E.2d 473 (1999).
Id. at 860-61, 524 S.E.2d at 477-78.
Id.
271 Ga. at 817, 525 S.E.2d at 346.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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absence, and the defendant and his counsel, who were both present at
the jury view, are unable to demonstrate any harm.'25
Also in Wilson the defense sought to introduce hearsay evidence that
a codefendant had told fellow inmates that he was involved with the
actual murder.'2 6 Invoking O.C.G.A. section 24-3-5, "Declarations of
conspirators,"'2 7 the defense tried to present this hearsay evidence to
the jury.128 In discussing the issue on appeal, the Georgia Supreme
Court observed that "this type of hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible" but that "there may be exceptional circumstances that make the
hearsay evidence sufficiently reliable and necessary to require its
admission. "129 The majority went on to state that:
whenever defense counsel seeks to admit this type of hearsay evidence
to support a claim that someone other than the defendant is responsible for the crimes being tried [counsel must follow certain procedures]:
it "must make a proffer in which the reliability and necessity of the
hearsay evidence are thoroughly set out and the trial court's ruling
must reflect consideration of the proffered evidence and a determination that the evidence does or does not show 'persuasive assurances of
trustworthiness,' or was made under0 circumstances providing
considerable assurance of its reliability."

Wilson failed to follow these procedures.13
Therefore, the supreme
court held that the trial court did not err in failing to address whether
the hearsay evidence "was sufficiently reliable, relevant, and necessary
to require its admission in the guilt/innocence phase of Wilson's
trial.' 3 2
At another point in the Wilson trial, the prosecution introduced
sentencing hearing evidence that defendant was involved with the "Folks
gang," that he was "claiming to be the gang's 'chief enforcer,' that the
gang required its members to commit violent criminal acts, and that his
33
residence contained materials consistent with his gang membership."
On appeal Wilson argued that under Dawson v. Delaware,' this

125. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 814, 525 S.E.2d at 345.
127. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-5 (1998).
128. 271 Ga. at 814, 525 S.E.2d at 345.
129. Id. at 814-15, 525 S.E.2d at 344-45.
130. Id. at 815, 525 S.E.2d at 345 (quoting Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 155, 476
S.E.2d 252, 258-59 (1996)).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 814, 525 S.E.2d at 344.
134. 503 U.S. 159 (1992).
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evidence violated his constitutional rights to free speech and association.135 The Georgia Supreme Court declined to discuss the claim,
pointing out that "[b]ecause the evidence in question was not objected to
Wilson is barred from challenging its introduction on apat trial,
13 6
peal."

In Pace defendant complained on appeal about the prosecutor's closing
argument at the sentencing phase in which he called upon biblical
parables and urged the jurors to put themselves in the shoes of the four
elderly victims when considering defendant's sentence. 137 The Georgia
Supreme Court, finding no error, pointed out that in both instances,
defense counsel had failed to object. 3 '
VI.

MANDATORY REVIEW

Georgia's death penalty statute requires an appeal to the supreme
court whether a defendant seeks it or not. 39 Three areas of mandatory review in the statute are: 1) whether the death sentence was the
result of "passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor"; 2) whether
the record supports the finding of the necessary statutory aggravating
circumstance; and 3) whether the death sentence was "excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering
both the crime and the defendant." 4 '
The death sentence in a Clayton County case was set aside on the
basis of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor when biblical
4
quotes had become a feature of the prosecutor's closing argument.1 1
Anthony Carruthers' defense counsel filed a pretrial motion in limine to
prevent the use of biblical passages or otherwise to ask the jury to
impose a death sentence based upon religion.4 2 In his closing the
assistant district attorney said, "[L]et me talk to you a moment about
some biblical references that help us in this case," and went on to

135. 271 Ga. at 813, 525 S.E.2d at 344.
136. Id. at 814, 525 S.E.2d at 344.
137. 271 Ga. at 844, 524 S.E.2d at 506-507.
138. Id. at 843-44, 524 S.E.2d at 506-07; see also Wilson, 271 Ga. at 816, 524 S.E.2d at
345 (a venireman had conversed with the murder victim about the Bible three times, but
defense counsel failed to move to strike for cause); Gulley, 271 Ga. at 344-46, 519 S.E.2d
at 662-64 (counsel failed to object at trial to evidence of a crime victim praying out loud in
the moments before she died, claims of trial court bias, and to improper closing argument
by prosecution); Palmer, 271 Ga. at 240, 517 S.E.2d at 508 (failure to request a victimimpact evidence jury charge precluded the issue from being challenged on appeal).
139. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35 (1998).
140. Id.
141. Carruthers v. State, 272 Ga. 306, 528 S.E.2d 217 (2000).
142. Id. at 308, 528 S.E.2d at 221.
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discuss how he read the Bible to require a death sentence. 143 Because
the trial court denied the motion in limine, the standard of review was
"not whether the improper argument in reasonable probability changed
the result of the trial, but simply whether the argument was objectionIn discussing the issue the majority noted
able and prejudicial."'
to due process" was secured by the review
"right
a
defendant's
that
17-10-35.145
section
O.C.G.A.
by
required
In its discussion the majority recognized that the court has "long
declined to disapprove of passing, oratorical references to religious texts
in arguments by counsel." 146 It went on to state:
It is difficult to draw a precise line between religious arguments that
are acceptable and those that are objectionable, but we conclude that
the assistant district attorney in this case overstepped the line in
directly quoting religious authority as mandating a death sentence. In
citing specific passages, he invoked a higher moral authority and
diverted the jury from the discretion provided to them under state law.
One passage cited explicitly states that whoever sheds another person's
blood shall have his own blood shed by man; another states that those
"who take the sword shall die by the sword." The prosecutor was
equally emphatic on the conclusion to be drawn from these passages:
"this is a message that is very clear, that society must deter criminals."
Languageof command and obligationfrom a source other than Georgia
law should not be presented to a jury.147
In Drane v. State, 48 the question of whether Leonard Drane's Elbert
County death sentence was proportionate to the life sentence received by
his codefendant, David Willis, was discussed at length.'49 Drane and
Willis were convicted of murdering a prostitute by savagely beating her
and cutting her throat. At jury trials the codefendant received a life
sentence, and Drane was sentenced to death. Drane argued for the
second time that his sentence was disproportionate to that received by
Willis."' The court rejected his claim with a recital of facts it thought
were established by the record:
The state presented evidence that Drane cut the victim's throat while
she was still breathing, helped dump her body and destroy evidence,

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id. at 308-10, 528 S.E.2d at 221-22.
Id. at 311, 528 S.E.2d at 222-23.
Id. at 309, 528 S.E.2d at 221.
Id. at 310, 528 S.E.2d at 222 (emphasis added).
271 Ga. 849, 523 S.E.2d 301 (1999).
Id. at 855, 523 S.E.2d at 306-07.
Id. at 849, 523 S.E.2d at 303.
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and made disparaging remarks about the victim after her murder.
There was also penalty phase evidence that Drane sexually assaulted
The death
another woman on the same night as the murder ....
sentence is also not disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant."'
VII.

STATE HABEAS CORPUS

State and federal post conviction proceedings are almost always a
feature of prosecutions resulting in a death penalty that is affirmed on
direct appeal. Often such petitions for habeas corpus relief include
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Tommy Lee Waldrip was sentenced to death, and his conviction was
affirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court.'52 He sought habeas relief
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.' 53 The court granted the
government's motion to compel access to trial and appellate counsel's
entire file in discovery.'54 Waldrip appealed the scope of that discovery
The court agreed with Waldrip
order to the Georgia Supreme Court."
that complete disclosure was too broad:
Following the rule adopted in other states, we hold that the filing of an
ineffective assistance claim is an implied waiver of the attorney-client
privilege limited to the documents that are relevant to the petitioner's
claim. Because of the potential problems that would be created by
public disclosure of the documents, we further conclude that Waldrip
is entitled to a protective order prohibiting disclosure of the files
obtained in this habeas proceeding to persons other than those needed
to assist the warden in rebutting the claim of ineffectiveness.' 56
VIII.

THE GEORGIA ELECTRIC CHAIR

The court had several opportunities to comment on the constitutionality of execution in the Georgia electric chair. The court was likely

151. Id. at 855, 523 S.E.2d at 306-07. Other decisions gave only perfunctory discussion
of the issue. See, e.g., Wilson, 271 Ga. at 823-24, 525 S.E.2d at 351; Gulley, 271 Ga. at 348,
519 S.E.2d at 664-65; Johnson, 271 Ga. at 385, 519 S.E.2d at 232; Pruitt,270 Ga. at 756,
514 S.E.2d at 651; Sears, 270 Ga. at 845-46, 514 S.E.2d at 437; Cromartie, 270 Ga. at 789,
514 S.E.2d at 215; and Speed, 270 Ga. at 700, 512 S.E.2d at 910.
152. Waldrip v. State, 267 Ga. 739, 482 S.E.2d 299 (1997).
153. Waldrip v. Head, 272 Ga. 572, 572, 532 S.E.2d 380, 383 (2000).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 573, 532 S.E.2d 384.
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57
and Alabama 58
mindful of recent developments on the Florida
electric chairs. Even against that backdrop the majority of the court
rejected challenges to the electric chair with no discussion.15 Justice
Sears dissented as to the constitutionality of the electric chair in Wilson,
writing that the majority made its decision "without the benefit of
forthcoming guidance from the United States Supreme Court on that
issue, and without an analysis of the voluminous evidence that is
available regarding the constitutional implications of electrocution."6 °
The 2000 General Assembly addressed the issue by amending the
relevant statutes to provide that after May 1, 2000, or in the event a
court of competent jurisdiction found the electric chair violated the state
or federal constitution, all inmates sentenced to death in Georgia would
be executed by lethal injection.''

157. A series of botched electrocutions brought two 4-3 decisions by the Florida
Supreme Court barely approving the continued use of the electric chair. Jones v. State,
701 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1997); Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1999). On October 26,
1999 the Supreme Court granted certiorari and a stay of execution in an Eighth
Amendment challenge to the Florida electric chair. Bryan v. Moore, 120 S. Ct. 394, 394
(1999). This was followed by a special session of the Florida Legislature, which enacted
a lethal injection "election" statute at section 922.10, Florida Statutes. Based upon this
legislative response, the Supreme Court then granted a motion by the Florida Attorney
General to dismiss the grant of certiorari as improvidently granted. Bryan v. Moore, 120
S. Ct. 1003, 1003 (2000).
158. Less than a month after withdrawing certiorari in the Florida case, the Supreme
Court entered a stay in another Eighth Amendment electric chair challenge out of
Alabama. Tarver v. Alabama, 120 S. Ct. 1005, 1005 (2000). This was widely read as a
signal that the electric chair's days were numbered. Three weeks later in an unusual
memorandum opinion that announced four justices would have set the case for oral
argument the Supreme Court denied certiorari. In re Tarver, 120 S.Ct. 1235, 1235 (2000).
Robert Lee Tarver Jr. was subsequently electrocuted. Killer who called chair cruel is
executed in it, ATLANTA CONST., April 15, 2000, at A9.
159. See, e.g., Holsey, 271 Ga. at 863, 524 S.E.2d at 480; Sears, 270 Ga. at 845, 514
S.E.2d at 437 (relying upon DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 786, 493 S.E.2d 157, 165
(1997), where Presiding Justice Fletcher was joined by Chief Justice Benham in an unusual
concurring opinion urging that the Georgia Assembly revisit the electric chair).
160. 271 Ga. at 824-25, 525 S.E.2d at 351 (Sears, J., dissenting). Justice Sears
dissented on the same grounds in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Pace, 271 Ga. at 846, 524
S.E.2d at 508; Holsey, 271 Ga. at 864, 524 S.E.2d at 480; Drane, 271 Ga. at 856, 523
S.E.2d at 307.
161. O.C.G.A. §§ 17-10-33, -38, -41 (Supp. 2000). Each of these provisions was amended
to remove language referring to the electric chair, and, when necessary, to replace it with
language referring to lethal injection. See also 2000 GA. LAWS 947, § 1 (stating that the
Georgia Assembly intends "to provide for execution by lethal injection for persons
sentenced to death after conviction of capital crimes committed on or after May 1, 2000"
and to provide for execution by lethal injection for those "sentenced to death for crimes
committed prior to the effective date" if a court of competent jurisdiction finds that
electrocution violates either the Georgia Constitution or the United States Constitutuion).
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IX.

UNIFIED APPEAL

The supreme court amended the rules of the Unified Appeal with
significant changes effective January 27, 2000.162 Established in 1989,
shall be
the Unified Appeal begins, "[tihe proceedings outlined here 163
applicable only in cases in which the death penalty is sought."

The Unified Appeal mandates two defense attorneys in all death
penalty cases, a lead counsel and cocounsel, often called second
chair. " For the first time, the lead attorney must: 1) have a minimum experience level consisting of one death penalty trial to verdict or
three capital but nondeath penalty trials to verdict; 2) be familiar with
the Unified Appeal procedures; 3) be familiar with the kinds of expert
testimony that is commonly part of death penalty trials; and 4) have
attended at least ten hours of specialized training on death penalty
defense preceeding trial and an additional ten hours for each year
during the life of the case. 65 The second chair must 1) have three
years of criminal trial experience; 2) have been lead or cocounsel in at
least one nondeath penalty murder trial or two felony jury trials; and 3)
meet the same specialized training requirements as lead counsel.'
Trial judges can make exceptions to these minimum requirements "for
good cause" provided the reasons are set forth on the record. 167
Also, for the first time, the court has included the twelve-page form for
the required Judge's Report. 6 ' The amendments also update the law
set out in the checklist.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

GA. R. UNIFIED APp.(2000).
Id.
Id. 2(A)(1).
Id. 2(A)(1)(a)(2), (3), (4) & (5).
Id. 2(A)(1)(b)(1), (2) & (3).
Id. 2(A)(3).

168. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35(a) (2000) requires a trial judge's report "inthe form of a
standard questionnaire prepared and supplied by the Supreme Court."
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